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The Imaginary Constitution 
SUZANNA SHERRY*  
ABSTRACT 
How many ways can conservatives spin an originalist tale to support their 
deregulatory, small-government vision? The answer is apparently infinite. In a 
new book, Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman are the latest in a long line of schol-
ars who insist that the real original meaning of the Constitution demands 
unwinding the regulatory state and substantially limiting the power of the fed-
eral government. They argue that the Constitution is a fiduciary instrument, spe-
cifically a power of attorney. After summarizing the book, this essay turns to 
three of its most important failings, each of which serves to make the book a 
work of politics, not history. In the end, their account is imaginative but their 
Constitution is imaginary.  
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INTRODUCTION 
How many ways can conservatives spin an originalist tale to support their 
deregulatory, small-government vision? The answer is apparently infinite. Gary 
Lawson and Guy Seidman are the latest in a long line of scholars who insist that 
the real meaning of the Constitution demands unwinding the regulatory state, 
limiting the power of the federal government, and, oh yes, invalidating the 
dreaded individual mandate of the ACA (thus saving a handful of Americans 
about $700 each).1 
You have to give them credit for imagination, though. Eschewing more tradi-
tional views of the Constitution as, alternatively, a plan of government, a pact 
among states, or a charter of liberty, they argue that the Constitution is a fiduciary 
instrument. Specifically, it is a grant of a power of attorney. In it, the principal— 
“We the People”—grants particular and limited powers to act on the principal’s 
behalf to three agents: the Congress, the President, and the federal courts. It is, in 
the words of the book’s subtitle, a fiduciary Constitution. 
In Part I of this essay, I provide a brief summary of the book. In the remaining 
parts, I turn to three of its most important failings, each of which serves to make 
the book a work of politics, not history. In the end, their account is imaginative 
but their Constitution is imaginary. 
I. OUR FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION 
Lawson and Seidman build their case in a logical fashion. They first examine 
the general structure and wording of contemporaneous powers (or letters) of at-
torney, which bear some similarity to the structure and wording of the 
Constitution. They suggest that most Americans of the time were probably famil-
iar with fiduciary instruments and fiduciary law, “either by serving as fiduciaries, 
having someone serve as their fiduciary, or knowing or being related to someone 
in one or the other of these categories.”2 To make the leap from private fiduciary 
relationships to “fiduciary government,” Lawson and Seidman focus on some of 
the Founding generation’s sources of political theory (“Fiduciary Government in 
1. See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE 
FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017). Their predecessors include RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL 
LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014) (arguing that the 
Founders meant to write a “classical liberal,” rather than “progressive,” Constitution); MICHAEL GREVE, 
THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION (2012) (arguing that the Founders wrote a Constitution embodying 
“competitive federalism”); RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004) (arguing 
that the Founders wrote a libertarian Constitution). 
2. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 29. 
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Theory”) and on state constitutions written before 1787 (“Fiduciary Government 
in Action”). 
They conclude that “[t]he case for viewing the Constitution as some kind of 
agency instrument is . . . overwhelming, even if the case for treating it specifically 
as an eighteenth-century person would have treated a power of attorney proves 
more equivocal.”3 They concede that the arguments for instead treating the 
Constitution as a species of corporate charter, rather than as a power of attorney, 
are “powerful.”4 Nonetheless, “because corporations, as public entities exercising 
delegated power, would be subject to fiduciary principles,” Lawson and Seidman 
contend that most of the general principles of fiduciary relationships are relevant 
regardless of whether the Constitution is specifically a power of attorney rather 
than a corporate charter.5 
If the Constitution is a power of attorney, Lawson and Seidman argue, then 
ascertaining its original meaning requires applying the background rules for inter-
preting powers of attorney and other fiduciary instruments—in short, eighteenth- 
century agency law. The three rules of agency law most significant to modern 
constitutionalists are the strict construction of the agent’s powers, the doctrine of 
principals and incidents, and the duty of personal exercise of delegated power.6 
According to the authors, the latter two applied to all fiduciary relationships, 
including corporations. However, again according to the authors, the requirement 
of strict construction applies only to powers of attorney; corporate charters are to 
be interpreted liberally.7 
And where do those background rules take us? Together, they result in an inter-
pretation of the Constitution that makes most of the past century or so of federal 
law unconstitutional. Lawson and Seidman do not talk much about the conse-
quences of narrowly construing federal power—especially the enumerated 
powers of Congress. But they do not have to. “Strict constructionism” has been a 
watchword of conservatives advocating small government for decades.8 Lawson 
3. Id. at 11; see also id. at 172 (“We claim the Constitution has enough resemblance to a fiduciary 
instrument, and specifically to a power of attorney, to make the eighteenth-century background rules for 
interpretation of such documents relevant at some level to ascertaining the meaning . . . of the 
Constitution.”). 
4. Id. at 68. 
5. Id. 
6. Lawson and Seidman discuss strict construction at 68–69 and 105–06, principals and incidents at 
79–103, and personal exercise (or non-delegation) at 104–129. They also discuss two other rules of 
agency law, the duties of care and loyalty (130–50) and the duty of impartiality (151–71). With one 
exception that I will mention later, none of these additional duties is of much relevance to today’s 
constitutional questions. 
7. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 68; see also id. at 106–07. I disclaim any independent 
knowledge of eighteenth-century agency or corporate law, and am relying entirely on their account 
whenever I describe such law. 
8. See, e.g., DAVID MERVIN, RONALD REAGAN AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 146 (1990) (“To be 
appointed to the federal judiciary during the Reagan years it was not enough to be a Republican, it was 
also necessary to be a ‘strict constructionist’”); Edward Lazarus, Bush and the Court, WASH. POST (Oct. 
24, 2000), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2000/10/24/bush-and-the-court/d72f38fd- 
d80a-4377-86eb-42ee4ca941e0/?utm_term=.22e217b04f43 [https://perma.cc/2L3E-N9V3] (reporting on 
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https://www.nytimes.com/1970/04/16/archives/in- 
the-nation-whats-a-strict-constructionist.html [https://perma.cc/EM3D-NHZS] (“In Judge Blackmun, it 
is said, President Nixon has found the ‘strict constructionist’ of the Constitution for which he had been 
searching.”); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 101 (2001) (arguing for a narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause); Robert H. Bork, Neutral 
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971) (“The judge must stick close 
to the text and the history, and their fair implications, and not construct new rights”). Lawson and 
Seidman do suggest—although they do not insist—that strict construction might make federal exercise 
of the power of eminent domain unconstitutional. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 94–96. 
and Seidman may also be circumspect here because of their earlier concession 
that the Constitution might be fairly viewed as a corporate charter (to be liberally 
construed) rather than as a power of attorney. They do, however, have a great 
deal to say about the consequences of the other two doctrines. 
The doctrine of principals and incidents means that an agent can exercise only 
expressly granted powers (principal powers) and those implied powers (inciden-
tal powers) that are “‘incident and directly necessary’ to execution of the princi-
pal powers.”9 An incidental power must thus be both subordinate or inferior to a 
principal power, and necessary to its execution. One of the most common ways 
that eighteenth-century fiduciary documents described incidental powers was to 
grant the agent the power to do all things “necessary and proper” to carry out the 
principal powers.10 (You can see where this is leading.) 
And so Lawson and Seidman create a list of things that cannot be incidental 
powers—and thus are not authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause— 
because such things are not subordinate or inferior. It is, according to them, “a 
close question” whether establishing a national bank is a principal or incidental 
power.11 They leave as an exercise for the reader whether regulating intrastate 
commerce is a principal or incidental power,12 thus implying that it is at least a 
close question. On other issues, they have no doubts. Compelling a person “to 
purchase a commercial product,” as they describe the ACA’s individual  
presidential nominee George W. Bush’s promise that Supreme Court “nominees be ‘strict 
constructionists’ who would not ‘legislate’ from the bench”); Tom Wicker, In The Nation: What’s a 
Strict Constructionist?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 1970), 
9. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 82 (quoting Lord Darcy v. Askwith, 80 Eng. Rep. 380, 380 
(1618)). 
10. Both strict construction and a narrow interpretation of incidental powers were, as Lawson and 
Seidman recognize, a solution to the problem of agency costs. LAWSON AND SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 
23–26. Ironically, the law’s strategy for dealing with agency costs has—like the Constitution itself— 
evolved since the eighteenth century, in ways that make strict construction and the doctrine of incidents 
especially inapt in the context of describing the powers of governmental institutions. As a leading 
scholar of fiduciary law has written, the early approach, “which predictably has failed, was to minimize 
the agent’s discretionary powers.” Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. 
L. REV. 1039, 1042 (2011). It failed because “the very purpose of retaining an agent with expertise is 
undermined if the agent is not given room to apply that expertise on behalf of the principal in changing 
conditions.” Id. at 1040–41. Similarly, to the extent that many in the Founding generation believed that 
legislators should rely on their own expertise or experience rather than simply mirroring the views of 
their constituents, see infra text accompanying notes 67–85, construing legislators’ powers narrowly 
defeats their ability to fulfill their obligations. 
11. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 89. 
12. Id. at 103. 
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mandate,13 is “an extraordinary power of independent significance.”14 They also 
describe the individual mandate as “forc[ing] people to deal with other private 
parties,” a description that could apply to much of federal antidiscrimination law, 
and which therefore suggests that such laws are outside the purview of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.15 The federal police power is also a principal 
power not granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause, as is federal command-
eering of state legislatures or executives.16 
Lawson and Seidman turn next to the principle that agents must exercise 
their discretionary duties personally. Applying this agency principle to the 
Constitution yields a robust non-delegation doctrine: “the Constitution forbids 
delegation of discretionary powers unless such delegation is explicitly or implic-
itly, but in either case affirmatively, authorized by the Constitution.”17 To illus-
trate, they focus on the particular example of Congress’s delegation to the 
National Marine Fisheries Service the determination of legal size limits for 
caught fish,18 finding it to be an unconstitutional delegation of discretionary legis-
lative power by the fiduciary Congress. But the principle applies to almost all del-
egations to administrative agencies, as Lawson and Seidman recognize. They 
note that “the grant of authority to the National Marine Fisheries Service is not 
even remotely unique or unusual in the scope or breadth of discretion granted to 
the agency to define lawful and unlawful conduct.”19 The administrative state, in 
other words, is largely unconstitutional. 
The non-delegation principle derived from fiduciary law goes even further 
than most versions of the non-delegation doctrine, which concentrate on 
13. Some of us might describe it as regulating how individuals participate in the interstate market for 
health insurance: Do they self-insure or do they outsource? See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Constitutional Uncertainty and the Design of Social Insurance: Reflections on the Obamacare 
Case, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 343, 346–48 (2013) (characterizing “the failure to buy health insurance 
as a decision to self-insure”); Ronald Kahn, The Commerce Clause and Executive Power: Exploring 
Nascent Individual Rights in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 73 MD. L. REV. 
133, 181 (2013) (“[I]t remains true that the decision whether to self-insure has an impact on interstate 
commerce.”); Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Individual Mandate as Healthcare Regulation: What the 
Obama Administration Should Have Said in NFIB v. Sebelius, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 539, 556–62 (2013) 
(arguing that “the mandate is a means of eliminating inefficiencies that arise from self-insured 
healthcare transactions”). 
14. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 93. 
15. Id. at 94. Perhaps they would consider federal prohibitions on race discrimination to be within 
Congress’s enumerated powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it’s hard to see how, on 
their reading of the Constitution, that argument could extend to federal civil rights laws that prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, or national origin. 
16. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 100. 
17. Id. at 112. 
18. Id. at 107–09. The example is drawn from Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). The 
actual case turned on the meaning of “tangible object” in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, and 
is well worth reading in its own right, both for the unusual alignment of Justices and for the clarity of the 
various opinions’ views on statutory interpretation. Lawson and Seidman would not even reach the 
statutory question, because they would find the delegation of authority to the agency unconstitutional in 
the first place. 
19. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 109. 
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delegations to administrative agencies. Because the fiduciary principle of non- 
delegation applies to all exercises of federal power, “there is no warrant for limit-
ing [its] reach.”20 Congress is not even permitted to delegate the governance of 
federal territories, federal property, federal enclaves, or the District of Columbia. 
It must manage and prescribe rules for all of those matters itself. And if that 
become too much to handle? Congress “can always turn land over to states or pri-
vate parties.”21 Talk about a blueprint for small government. 
In short, interpreting the Constitution as incorporating the background princi-
ples of eighteenth-century fiduciary law produces results that conservative politi-
cians and academics have been advocating—and mostly failing to persuade 
legislatures or courts to adopt—since the New Deal. As the blurb on the jacket 
notes, the book is fundamentally a “picture of the original design for limited 
government.” 
And there’s more! One of the problems with originalism (and, as I will suggest 
in the next section, the book depends on originalist premises) is that it cannot 
explain some iconic cases that Americans believe to be unequivocally correct.22 
The originalist response is often a strained attempt to fit the cases within the origi-
nalist paradigm. Michael McConnell, for example, has made a valiant effort to 
defend Brown v. Board of Education23 on originalist grounds.24 Lawson and 
Seidman’s fiduciary Constitution provides an originalist justification for Bolling 
v. Sharp,25 Brown’s companion case invalidating segregated schools in the 
District of Columbia. Here they rely on the duty of impartiality to conclude that 
Congress, as a fiduciary, is “required to act fairly as between different classes of 
beneficiary.”26 Because Congress had no reasonable grounds to distinguish 
between black and white schoolchildren, it did not act fairly when it established 
racially segregated schools in the District of Columbia.27 Thus the fiduciary 
Constitution not only accomplishes the goals of conservatives, it also legitima-
tizes one of the most iconic and most doctrinally difficult Supreme Court cases. 
Bolling aside, if Lawson and Seidman are correct, we must undo much of the 
jurisprudence (and invalidate most of the federal laws and virtually all of the 
20. Id. at 125. 
21. Id. at 126. 
22. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Progressive Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the Significance 
of Landmark Decisions in Evaluating Constitutional Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 6 (2011). 
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
24. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 
(1995). The effort is generally viewed as unsuccessful by historians. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, 
Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 
1881 (1995). Lawson and Seidman explicitly make no claims about either state powers or the limitations 
imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 12, 147, 175 n.26. 
25. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). As Lawson and Seidman note, the constitutional basis for Bolling is 
somewhat problematic. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 151–56. 
26. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 157 (quoting 1 SAMUEL LIVERMORE, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 85–86 (1818)). 
27. Id. at 170–71. 
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administrative regulations) of the past seventy-five years or so. Luckily for those 
of us who live in the modern era, they are not correct. 
First, their underlying premise—that the meaning of the Constitution depends 
on what the Founding generation thought it meant—is tired and unpersuasive. In 
the next Part, I will not rehearse the familiar arguments against originalism, but 
will instead explain why, despite their own disclaimers about the scope of their 
project, the book depends on an originalist perspective. Second, their historical 
account is, at best, incomplete and misleading, and in some instances wrong, as I 
will describe in Part III. Finally, their account of the fiduciary Constitution has 
limited usefulness in today’s circumstances, in which one of the primary prob-
lems facing government is that both the “principals” and the “beneficiaries” of 
the fiduciary relationship have conflicts among themselves that the “agent” must 
resolve. I describe this flaw, which is related to the most important lapse in their 
historical analysis, in Part IV. 
II. ORIGINALIST ALL THE WAY 
As a work of pure history, the book has its charms. Who knew that eighteenth- 
century legal forms could be so interesting,28 or that Latin scholars disagree on 
the best translation of Cicero’s De Officiis?29 Lawson and Seidman write breezily, 
especially when they are being descriptive rather than prescriptive, and one can 
learn quite a bit from them. 
The problem is that what one learns is irrelevant to constitutional law unless 
one is an originalist. Unless we agree that the Constitution should be interpreted 
according to its original public meaning—which, as the authors suggest, includes 
background assumptions about how to interpret documents of the character of the 
Constitution—then neither the original public meaning nor the background 
assumptions make much difference in interpreting today’s Constitution. Even if 
we accept the original meaning as merely a starting point for interpretation (a 
method that most originalists would not consider sufficiently originalist), that 
meaning ends up doing so little work in any controversial constitutional context 
that layering in a few background assumptions will not change anything. Sure, it 
might be interesting to know that the Founding generation thought the “take 
care” clause of Article II, or the constitutionally mandated presidential oath of 
office, embodied or reflected fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.30 But that infor-
mation likely will not have any influence on a non-originalist’s view of exactly 
what the President is or is not permitted to do. 
Lawson and Seidman try to finesse this problem by disclaiming any prescrip-
tive intent.31 They say that they “make no claims about the extent to which the 
28. See id. at 14–23. 
29. See id. at 33–35. 
30. See id. at 131–32. 
31. See id. at 2 (“Our focus in this book is purely interpretative rather than prescriptive”); id. at 5 
(“all of the claims in this book are positive, or empirical, claims”). 
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meaning [they] discover should or must contribute to legal decision making.”32 
They contend that although their project is “a species of originalism,” it is unlike 
most originalist methodologies because those others are “really theories of judi-
cial role or practical governance,” not “theories of pragmatic meaning.” In that 
case, however, it is unclear why the book has value to anyone outside a handful 
of legal historians and, in particular, why it should be read by lawyers or judges 
or discussed at a law school symposium. 
Moreover, these disclaimers ring hollow in the context of other statements. For 
example, in the same introductory section in which they make the disclaimers 
quoted in the previous paragraph, they state that “understanding the fiduciary 
character of the Constitution is important not simply as a historical matter but 
also for its contribution to constitutional interpretation.”33 Come again? Their 
findings are relevant to “constitutional interpretation” but not to “legal decision 
making”? They explain this apparent contradiction by insisting on a very special-
ized meaning of “constitutional interpretation”: “the process of discerning the 
communicative signals sought to be conveyed by the Constitution’s author.”34 
They claim to “present . . . no theory about the appropriate way to translate consti-
tutional meaning into constitutional adjudication.”35 This distinction between 
constitutional meaning or constitutional interpretation on the one hand, and legal 
decision-making or constitutional adjudication on the other, appears to be similar 
to the distinction that many originalists try to draw between interpretation and 
construction.36 
But neither distinction is successful in its attempt to split the atom. Either the 
“communicative signals” of the author are dispositive (when discernable) or they 
are not. For originalists, they are dispositive. For non-originalists, they are not— 
and, as I noted earlier, when these signals are composed of persnickety back-
ground assumptions about fiduciary law they are likely not even to be relevant. 
So we are back to the question of why we might want to, in their words, “seek 
only to ascertain the meaning of a particular historical document,”37 unless we 
think that meaning is binding today. 
Lawson and Seidman, at some level, recognize the originalist underpinnings of 
their arguments. The book is peppered with loose language suggesting that they 
think judges and others should use their insights in contemporary constitutional 
adjudication. They talk about the case for “viewing” the Constitution as a fiduci-
ary instrument in the same sentence as the case for “treating” it as specifically a 
32. Id. at 6. 
33. Id. at 7. 
34. Id. at 8. 
35. Id. at 170. 
36. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 453 (2013); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 
(2011). According to Barnett, “interpretation” is “discovering the semantic meaning” of a document 
(which is “fixed at the time of its enactment”), while “construction” is “applying that meaning to 
particular factual circumstances.” Barnett, supra, at 66–67. 
37. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 8. 
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power of attorney. The parallelism between the passive “viewing” and the active 
“treating” betrays an unconscious recognition that they are not merely looking 
for constitutional meaning but seeking to implement it. They close the book by 
suggesting that omitting the law of agency from “U.S. law school curricula . . .
might be a mistake of constitutional magnitude.”38 Why would it be imperative, 
rather than, say, intellectually broadening, for law students to learn agency law 
unless it is somehow relevant to constitutional decision-making today? And, of 
course, if they are not interested in constitutional adjudication, why do they 
bother to apply their fiduciary principles to modern questions such as the constitu-
tionality of the ACA, the regulation of intrastate commerce, or the delegation of 
authority to administrative agencies? 
In short, the book has nothing to say to non-originalists unless they happen to 
have an interest in quirky questions of American legal history. A nice article for 
the Green Bag, perhaps, but not a 200-page, heavily footnoted book. It is disin-
genuous for the authors to claim that they are shocked (shocked!) that some might 
read them as pushing their conservative views about interpretive strategies, and 
the results of those strategies, on judges and lawyers. 
III. LAW-OFFICE HISTORY 
The book also fails on its own terms as a work of history. Although it purports 
to be an accurate, apolitical, historical account, it is riddled with errors large and 
small, revealing it as a work of advocacy rather than history. I will start with 
some examples of small—but telling—mistakes or omissions, and then show 
how the overall tenor of the book misleads the reader into a false portrait of the 
Founding generation’s39 views on government, representation, and the dangers 
that the Constitution was designed to avoid. 
A. Errors and Omissions 
Lawson and Seidman rely on three broad categories of evidence for their con-
clusion that the Constitution is a fiduciary document. The first is a long quotation 
from James Iredell, in which he actually calls the Constitution “a great power of 
attorney.”40 The second is an analysis of the Founding generation’s theories and 
practice of government, to show that eighteenth-century Americans “would have 
regarded the creation of a government as something requiring resort to fiduciary 
concepts . . . .”41 Finally, they draw a comparison between the language and struc-
ture of powers of attorney and the language and structure of the Constitution. 
I will focus here on their first two evidentiary points. The last depends on a 
judgment about the relative similarities and differences, and is ultimately 
38. Id. at 172. 
39. The authors explicitly ignore amendments beyond the Bill of Rights. Id. at 175 n.32. This creates 
a further problem: To the extent that later amendments have an interactive effect on interpretation, 
singling out one era distorts the meaning of the Constitution as a whole. 
40. Id. at 3. 
41. Id. at 31. 
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unpersuasive because the differences are as great as the similarities. Thus, much 
depends on whether the authors are correctly portraying the views of Iredell and 
the Founding generation on fiduciary government. After demonstrating that they 
are not, I will turn to a few other omissions that undercut their historical claims. 
1. Iredell’s Speech 
Let’s start with Iredell. (Bear with me: this is going to be quite detailed, 
because the authors’ painstaking detail is what makes the book so superficially 
persuasive . . . and so misleading.) The book quotes one of Iredell’s speeches in 
the North Carolina ratifying convention, in which he argued against the need for 
a bill of rights.42 Iredell began by arguing that there is no need for such protec-
tions in a document that expressly enumerates the powers of the government, 
because by definition the people retain all power not given. This is where he drew 
the analogy to a power of attorney, and he continued by giving an example of 
what someone who has a power of attorney can and cannot do. So far, so good. 
But Lawson and Seidman include one more (partial) sentence of Iredell’s 
speech: “A bill of rights, as I conceive, would not only be incongruous, but dan-
gerous.”43 From this, they conclude that Iredell was making a second point: “the 
Constitution’s character as a document has implications for the interpretative pre-
sumptions that apply to it.”44 However, they have cut Iredell off mid-speech. He 
continued: It would be dangerous 
because it would be implying, in the strongest manner, that every right not 
included in the exception might be impaired by the government without usur-
pation; and it would be impossible to enumerate every one. Let any one make 
what collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will immediately men-
tion twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it.45 
42. Id. at 3. 
43. Id. This is their version of Iredell’s speech, which ends with a period because it is the end of the 
sentence. Another version would use ellipses instead, because the sentence continues. That is also why I 
include “partial” in parentheses. See infra text accompanying notes 45–46. 
44. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 4. They do not flesh this point out, but I presume that 
Lawson and Seidman are arguing that the “danger” of including a bill of rights is that, interpreting the 
Constitution as a power of attorney, the inclusion of a bill of rights would change the meaning of the 
document by expanding the powers granted to the attorney. 
45. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 174 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1st ed. 1836). Elliot’s second edition, which is the one cited by 
Lawson and Seidman, contains a different version of Iredell’s statement. Immediately following the 
portion quoted by Lawson and Seidman, Iredell goes on to say: “No man, let his ingenuity be what it 
will, could enumerate all the individual rights not relinquished by this Constitution.” 4 THE DEBATES IN 
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 149 (Jonathan 
Elliot ed., 2d rev. ed. 1891). He then suggests that a future interpreter of the Constitution would assume 
that Congress could violate any rights not listed. Both editions of Elliot are available at HeinOnline, 
making it easy to consult both. In this case, the difference between the editions does not detract from my 
point in the text, because it is clear in both versions of the speech that Iredell is worried about protecting 
rights, not limiting powers. 
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Why does this matter? It matters because Lawson’s and Seidman’s truncated 
version of the speech makes it seem as if Iredell’s last sentence was about powers, 
but the full speech reveals that it was really about rights.46 
So they are left with merely pointing out that Iredell called the Constitution a 
power of attorney. And, as they concede, he appears to be the only person to do 
so until Lawson and Seidman themselves.47 Contrast that silence with the evi-
dence supporting characterizing the Constitution as a truly novel instrument, 
analogous to nothing else—a characterization Lawson and Seidman explicitly 
reject.48 As Caleb Nelson has documented, many people in and around the 
Founding Era characterized the Constitution in just that way.49 The fact that no 
one other than Iredell expressed the view that it was a power of attorney is there-
fore quite telling against the book’s historical thesis. 
2. Fiduciary Government 
Lawson and Seidman also ignore an important eighteenth-century debate that 
cuts against their conclusions. They bolster their claim that the Founding genera-
tion adhered to a fiduciary theory of government by pointing to “strong move-
ments in favor of an obligation on the part of representatives to follow specific 
instructions of the electorate.”50 But they neglect to mention that during congres-
sional debates on the Bill of Rights, Thomas Tudor Tucker of South Carolina, an 
Anti-Federalist, moved to insert a right of the people to “instruct their representa-
tives,” which was soundly defeated.51 Relatedly, Lawson and Seidman dismiss 
the absence of any specific language in the Constitution (or the Bill of Rights, as 
Tucker wanted) reflecting a fiduciary relationship by arguing that the “fiduciary 
character of government in 1788 was as obvious, and possibly even more so, as 
the absence of federal power to abridge the freedom of the press.”52 Maybe so, 
46. Yes, I know those might be considered two sides of the same coin. But when we are talking 
about analogizing governmental powers to powers of attorney (the latter of which do not have or need a 
concept of “rights”), the semantic difference is important. Daryl Levinson’s work illuminates the 
importance of the difference between powers and rights. For example, he has explained that 
constitutional structure—in other words, government powers—is more likely to become entrenched 
(and thus immune from ordinary politics) than are constitutional rights, in part because the constitutional 
structure allows compromises and trade-offs over time, thus discouraging defection by those 
disappointed by particular outcomes. Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of 
Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 717–33 (2011); see also Daryl J. Levinson, 
Foreword to Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 33–34 (2016) (making clear that 
the powers of Congress are part of the structural constitution). 
47. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 62. They credit Robert Natelson, in a 2004 article, with 
first recognizing the fiduciary or agency-law underpinnings of at least some clauses of the Constitution, 
id. at 7, but Lawson and Seidman appear to be the first to point specifically to powers of attorney. That 
matters, as I pointed out earlier, because not all fiduciary obligations require strict construction of the 
powers granted to the fiduciary. 
48. Id. at 55–57. 
49. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003). 
50. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 40. 
51. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 733, 747 (1789). 
52. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 46. 
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but Congress (to say nothing of the states) was convinced of the need to make 
freedom of the press explicit, and nevertheless rejected every attempt to insert 
language into the Constitution that would strengthen its fiduciary character.53 
3. Actions Speak Louder than Words 
Additionally, Lawson and Seidman omit any mention of the history of what 
the Founding generation did once the Constitution was ratified and the federal 
government began operations. First, contrary to their argument that the fiduciary 
Constitution prohibits the delegation of discretionary power, Congress immedi-
ately established and delegated discretionary power to a host of administrative 
agencies, including the Customs Service, the post office, and commissions to 
oversee military pensions, patents, fishing rights, and trade with Indian tribes, 
among other things.54 Second, within a little more than a decade, Congress and 
the President had exercised powers that were neither enumerated in the Constitution 
nor easily described as subordinate or inferior—and therefore incidental—to 
those enumerated powers. While some of these actions were constitutionally 
controversial, the fact remains that the same generation (and many of the same 
individuals) who drafted and ratified the Constitution ultimately found them 
constitutionally acceptable. Consider the Louisiana Purchase,55 the creation of 
federal criminal laws,56 and the Alien Acts.57 These examples and the broad 
53. In addition to rejecting a right to instruct representatives, Congress also rejected a proposal to 
insert “expressly” in what became the Tenth Amendment, between “not” and “delegated.” See infra text 
accompanying notes 66, 82–84. 
54. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012). For an account of the tremendous 
discretion accorded to customs officials in particular, see GAUTHAM RAO, NATIONAL DUTIES: CUSTOMS 
HOUSES AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 81–97 (2016). 
55. Lawson and Seidman argue that the power to acquire new territory is incident to the power to 
admit new states, but it is unclear when and how the Louisiana territories (unlike the western territory 
ceded by existing states, on which they base their argument) were “destined for statehood.” LAWSON & 
SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 102. The massive controversy over the Purchase’s constitutionality does not 
help the authors, because, ultimately, Jefferson acted despite his scruples and the Congress acquiesced. 
See, e.g., DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 1801–1805, at 313–25 (1970) 
(documenting Jefferson’s doubts about constitutionality); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN 
CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS 1801–1829, at 98, 99–104 (2001) (noting that the treaty with Napoleon 
was approved by Senate in four days, but the implementing legislation was more controversial); see also 
generally EVERETT SOMERVILLE BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 
1803–1812 (1920). 
56. See generally Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of Federalism and the Nature of Federal 
Criminal Jurisdiction, 48 EMORY L.J. 1, 55–60 (1996). Kurland notes that “[a]t the outset, the First 
Congress recognized that federal criminal law authority was not limited to the few explicit constitutional 
grants of authority to define punishments.” Id. at 56. It is arguable whether all of the early criminal laws 
can be characterized as an exercise of incidental powers; Lawson and Seidman do not discuss these laws 
and note only that a “federal police power” is “easily a principal power.” LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra 
note 1, at 100. 
57. In 1798, Congress enacted the Alien Acts (along with the more famous Sedition Act). 1 Stat. 570 
(1798). The Alien Friends Act allowed the President to deport aliens whom he deemed “dangerous to the 
peace and safety of the United States”; it was harshly criticized and expired in 1801. For a description 
of the controversy over the Alien Friends Act, see GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE 
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delegation of discretionary power cast doubt on the book’s conclusions that the 
Founding generation thought they were creating a document that incorporated 
the principles of fiduciary law. 
4. Other Historical Problems 
Other omissions similarly undermine their historical account. For example, 
Lawson and Seidman provide essentially no support for their (crucial) statement 
that “many members” of the general public were familiar with fiduciary law. The 
only support they offer is to quote an article (in a 2010 book they edited) that says 
“there is reason to believe” people in that era had more exposure to fiduciaries 
because shorter life expectancies meant more executors of estates and the execu-
tors worked in teams.58 They also assume that their evidence supporting the 
Founding generation’s “infatuation with fiduciary government”59 necessarily 
translates into a need to consider the background rules of fiduciary relationships 
in interpreting the Constitution. But, as one scholar of fiduciary law has noted, 
the rules governing fiduciary relationships developed in the context of tightly cir-
cumscribed numbers of beneficiaries, “and did not contemplate the rise of less 
personal and direct relationships between institutional fiduciaries and large num-
bers of beneficiaries that exist today.”60 Lawson and Seidman thus fail to support 
their assertion that general theories of fiduciary government translated—for 
eighteenth-century Americans—into an expectation that the Constitution was 
creating a government bound by the formal rules of fiduciary law. 
These representative errors and omissions raise the suspicion that Lawson and 
Seidman are engaged in “law-office history.”61 But the more serious problem 
with their historical account is that in describing the Constitution as a power of at-
torney (or as a fiduciary instrument more generally), they mischaracterize the 
views of the constitution-makers as consonant with today’s political conserva-
tives. In particular, they mistakenly portray the Founding generation as in favor 
of small and limited government, as envisioning the legislature as faithful agents 
of the people rather than as a deliberative body, and as concerned only (or primar-
ily) with potential governmental perfidy. As I show in the next section, none of 
those characterizations accurately describes the Founding era.62 
SPEECH IN WARTIME 31–33 (2004). The Alien Enemies Act, however, is still in force as 50 U.S.C. § 21, 
and allows the President to restrain and deport citizens of a hostile nation. Again, it is arguable whether 
the power to enact such a law is incidental to the power to declare war, but Lawson and Seidman do not 
even mention it. 
58. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 29–30. 
59. Id. at 31. 
60. Lauren R. Roth, The Collective Fiduciary, 94 NEB. L. REV. 511, 523–24 (2011). Roth suggests 
that we should “distinguish[] the responsibilities of fiduciaries based on the number of beneficiaries they 
serve.” Id. at 528. 
61. “Law-office history” is “the selection of data favorable to the position being advanced without 
regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper evaluation of the relevance of the data offered.” 
Alfred Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 122 & n.13 (1965). 
62. The members of the Founding generation, like the members of any generation, were not 
monolithic. Even beyond the general distinctions I draw below between Federalist and Anti-Federalist 
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B. Mischaracterizing the Founders as Modern Conservatives 
1. Small Government 
Lawson and Seidman perpetuate the myth that the Founding generation 
intended to create a small national government of limited powers. As numerous 
recent historical analyses have shown, that is simply not true.63 Indeed, the 
Constitution owes its existence to the failed experiment with a weak national gov-
ernment under the Articles of Confederation.64 It would therefore be surprising if 
the Constitution were designed to replicate the federal government of the Articles 
rather than creating a new and powerful national government. As many historians 
have shown, it was primarily the Anti-Federalists—following in the footsteps of 
the English “Country” party—who opposed a strong national government.65 
They were the ones who favored a restrictive view of the powers granted by the 
Constitution, both by urging a strict and narrow textualism and by trying to insert 
the word “expressly” into the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers not 
delegated.66 The fiduciary Constitution described by Lawson and Seidman is thus 
more reflective of the dissenting voices of the Founding generation than of the 
prevailing views. 
2. The Nature of Representation 
Lawson and Seidman also present only one side of another schism, this one 
about the nature of representation. In arguing that the government has fiduciary 
obligations, they come very close to presenting John Adams’s position that the 
legislature “should be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large. It 
should think, feel, reason, and act like them.”67 For example, they quote one of 
views, different members of each faction held varied beliefs—which also sometimes changed over time. 
Because Lawson and Seidman paint with a broad brush, I will here do the same. But readers should 
recognize that my descriptions are generalizations and are subject to multiple exceptions and variations. 
63. See, e.g., MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE (2003); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996); cf. Calvin H. Johnson, 
Madison’s Denial, 34 CONST. COMM. 193, 203 (2019) (“The best evidence is that neither the text nor the 
drafting history of the Constitution supports the enumerated power limitation.”). 
64. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP 73–125 (2016). For a briefer overview, 
see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 32–35 (3d 
ed. 2013). 
65. See, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING 
TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828 (1999); James H. Hutson, Country, Court, and Constitution: 
Antifederalism and the Historians, 38 WM. & M. Q. 337 (1981). 
66. See CORNELL, supra note 65, at 11, 59, 160, 187. 
67. JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT (1776), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL 
WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, 1760–1805, at 403 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds. 
1983). Highlighting the close kinship between this view of representation as requiring that the 
legislature be a mirror of the public and the view of the legislature as the public’s fiduciary is that, a 
decade earlier, Adams had espoused a view of representation very similar to that of Lawson and 
Seidman: “It is nothing more than this, the people choose attorneys to vote for them in the great councils 
of the nation, reserving always the fundamentals of government, reserving also a right to give their 
attorneys instructions how to vote.” The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym, BOSTON GAZETTE, Jan. 27, 
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Cato’s Letters that representatives “shall . . . never have any interest detached 
from the Persons entrusting and represented,” and note that the same theme is 
prevalent in other essays.68 During the Revolutionary Era—as opposed to the 
Founding Era—Adams (and thus Lawson and Seidman) probably accurately 
reflected the views of most Americans. Having suffered under Burke’s theory of 
“virtual representation,” they were determined to create legislatures that were 
mere agents of their constituents.69 
But by the late 1780s, experience with state legislatures acting as pure agents 
of popular will had chastened and sobered the views of many. Views of the mean-
ing of representation also changed as legislatures themselves took on additional 
roles; freed from the need to control a monarch, state legislatures could diverge 
from Parliament’s traditional passive role as protector of the people and become 
more active in “adopting policies that would contribute to the prosperity of soci-
ety and the happiness of citizens.”70 Finally, the demands of the Revolutionary 
War required state legislatures (and the Confederation Congress, to the extent it 
could) to be more active.71 All of these factors “subverted the republican belief 
that a representative assembly could both mirror society and pursue the general 
good.”72 A new vision of representation—which required knowledgeable, experi-
enced legislators to deliberate for the good of the nation rather than simply mirror 
the views of the constituents—began to take hold. 
We can see evidence of both the older and newer views of government in the 
debates in the Constitutional Convention and the debates in Congress over the 
Bill of Rights.73 James Wilson, for example, thought the legislature “ought to be 
the most exact transcript of the whole society.”74 George Mason echoed that older 
view, arguing that representatives “should sympathize with their constituents 
[and] should think as they think and feel as they feel.”75 Roger Sherman, on the 
other hand, said that the people “should have as little to do as may be about the 
Government.”76 Gouverneur Morris viewed the Senate, at least, as a check on 
“the precipitation, changeableness, and excesses” of the popularly elected 
1766, reprinted in 3 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 481 (Charles Adams ed., 1850–1856). As noted infra, at 
text accompanying notes 82–84, by the late 1780s the idea of a right to instruct representatives had 
become controversial and ultimately lost out. 
68. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 40. 
69. As Lawson & Seidman recognize, see id., one of the best accounts of these Revolutionary-Era 
views is found in GORDON WOOD, REPRESENTATION IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (rev. ed. 2008). But 
as Wood also points out, the Constitutional era saw new voices raised against the Revolutionary passion 
for “actual” representation. Id. at 55. 
70. RAKOVE, supra note 63, at 205. 
71. Id. at 216–17. Rakove’s account here also helps dispel the myth that the Founding generation 
thought they were creating a small and inactive government with limited powers. 
72. Id. at 217. 
73. Both views were probably also expressed in the state ratifying conventions and other ratification 
debates. My purpose here is to provide representative examples rather than an exhaustive account. 
74. JAMES MADISON, NOTES ON DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 74 (June 6) 
(Adrienne Koch ed. 1966) (hereinafter “Madison’s Notes”). 
75. Id. at 75. 
76. Id. at 39 (May 31). 
2019] THE IMAGINARY CONSTITUTION 455 
House.77 James Madison similarly appealed to what “[a] people deliberating in a 
temperate moment” might do, concluding that at least one of the branches ought 
to consist of those with “a competent knowledge of the public interests.”78 Even 
the nature of representation in the Convention itself was disputed. Gouverneur 
Morris contended that “he came here as a Representative of America,” not to 
“truck and bargain for our particular states.”79 
Finally, Madison in Federalist No. 10 recognized the need for an independent, 
“disinterested” legislature rather than one that mirrored the views of the populace. 
The virtues of the legislature of a large republic are twofold, he suggested, and 
both virtues contemplate a deliberative, rather than mirror-like, body. Such a 
legislature will “refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the 
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true 
interest of their country.” And this filtering could make it likely “that the public 
voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant 
to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for 
the purpose.”80 Federalist No. 10 represents the hope that legislators will in 
fact be better than their constituents, “that interest groups will neutralize each 
other, thereby creating space for virtuous individuals to rise to positions of 
leadership.”81 
The dispute over the validity of the agency (or mirror) theory of representation 
was again on full display when the House of Representatives debated Tucker’s 
motion to include a right to instruct representatives. Beginning again with the 
older view, John Page of Virginia took the agency view, arguing that “[i]nstruc-
tion and representation in a Republic appear to me to be inseparably con-
nected.”82 George Clymer of Pennsylvania took the opposite position, calling a 
right to instruct “utterly destructive of all ideas of an independent and deliberative 
body, which are essential requisites in the Legislatures of free Governments.”83 
Fellow Pennsylvanian Thomas Hartley was even more clear in rejecting the older 
view: “It appears to my mind that the principle of representation is distinct from 
any agency that may require written instructions. The great end of meeting is to 
consult for the common good.”84 
77. Id. at 233 (July 2). 
78. Id. at 193 (June 26). 
79. Id. at 240 (July 5). The Convention reached no definitive resolution of the nature of 
representation. They were more concerned with the practical problem of how to constitute a national 
legislature in a way that satisfied large states, small states, slave states, free states, federalists, and 
nationalists. The underlying philosophical disagreements merely surfaced during some of these more 
pressing debates. 
80. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). 
81. Ganesh Sitaraman, The Relevance and Irrelevance of the Founders, 110 HARV. L. REV. 619, 
624–25 (2006). 
82. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 734 (1789). 
83. Id. at 735. 
84. Id. at 734. As noted earlier, Tucker’s motion was defeated, although that does not necessarily 
mean that the deliberative view of representation prevailed. Many members opposed the motion for 
more practical reasons. 
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This divergence of views about the nature of representation was unlike the 
debate about the appropriate size and power of the national government. The lat-
ter, as I have already suggested, mostly broke down along established ideological 
lines and was decisively resolved in favor of the Federalists. The debate about the 
nature of representation, however, sometimes crossed those lines, with some 
Federalists clinging to the older notions about legislatures as mirrors of their con-
stituents and some Anti-Federalists favoring the newer view of deliberative legis-
latures.85 And the disputes about the nature of representation were not 
definitively resolved during the Founding era. So the problem with Lawson’s and 
Seidman’s historical account here is not that they present a view that was 
rejected, but rather that they present as a consensus only one side of a very active 
debate. Like their other omissions, it suggests that the book is advocacy rather 
than historical scholarship. 
3. The Founding Generation’s Other Great Fear: Majority Tyranny 
Finally, Lawson and Seidman focus on only one of the Founding generation’s 
two major concerns. They are undoubtedly correct that one great worry of the era 
was that government, as agents of the people, might be unfaithful to their trust. 
Protections against governmental perfidy—or what Zephyr Teachout calls the 
“anti-corruption principle”86—are found throughout the Constitution and figured 
prominently in contemporaneous debates. I have already suggested that agency 
law is not the most apt analogy to describe how the Founding Era responded to 
those fears. The more significant problem with the book’s historical analysis, 
however, is that it leaves out entirely a second major concern: majority tyranny. 
G. Edward White has summarized the Founders’ concerns: 
[A]longside the evils of monarchic tyranny and corruption that American 
republicans identified were another set of evils, and . . . the form of govern-
ment created by the Constitution was designed to respond to those as well as to 
the former set. The other evils were democratic tyranny and corruption, the 
expected results of interactions between demagogues and the untutored 
masses . . . . [T]he proponents of the Constitution, while understanding the im-
portance of a theoretical relocation of sovereignty in “the people,” held, in the 
main, a skeptical view of the capacity of the people as a whole to govern them-
selves . . . .87 
85. Both Gordon Wood and Saul Cornell argue that dispute about the nature of representation did 
break largely along Federalist/Anti-Federalist lines. See CORNELL, supra note 65, at 147–53; WOOD, 
supra note 69, at 54. Looking only at the debates in the Convention, this does not seem to me to be as 
clear as it is to Cornell and Wood. If, however, Cornell and Wood are correct, then Lawson and Seidman 
are even more misleading: rather than simply limiting themselves to one side of an ongoing debate, they 
have attributed to the Constitution the views of the losing side. 
86. Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009). 
87. G. Edward White, Reading the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 787, 794–95 (1994). 
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As Gordon Wood put it, describing reactions to the popular state governments 
established after independence: “An excess of power in the people was leading 
. . . to a new kind of tyranny, not by traditional rules, but by the people them-
selves.”88 Forrest McDonald has described one of the Founders’ goals as “pre-
venting self-government from degenerating into majoritarian tyranny.”89 
We can see evidence of this fear before, during, and after the Constitutional 
Convention. In 1787, Benjamin Rush epitomized the twin concerns of faithless 
government agents and tyrannical majorities: “In our opposition to monarchy, we 
forgot that the temple of tyranny has two doors. We bolted one of them by proper 
restraints, but we left the other open, by neglecting to guard against the effects of 
our own ignorance and licentiousness.”90 
Benjamin Rush, Address to the People of the United States (Jan. 1787), at http://teaching 
americanhistory.org/library/document/address-to-the-people-of-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/F6KJ- 
YP4C] (quoted in MCDONALD, supra note 89, at 3). 
James Madison, writing to Thomas 
Jefferson, emphasized that majority tyranny was the greater danger: “the invasion 
of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government con-
trary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the 
mere instrument of the major number of constituents.”91 
This skeptical view of democracy—and the fear of a tyranny of the majority— 
was shared by Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike. “The Anti-Federalists were 
not latter-day democrats . . . . The last thing in the world they wanted was a 
national democracy which would permit Congressional majorities to operate 
freely and without restraint.”92 In the Constitutional Convention, Elbridge Gerry, 
who became a leading Anti-Federalist, lamented the “excess of democracy.”93 
During the ratification debates, Anti-Federalist Maryland “Farmer” contended 
that in democracies, “the tyranny of the legislative is most to be dreaded,”94 and 
Anti-Federalist “Agrippa” wrote that it is “as necessary to defend an individual 
against the majority in a republick as against the king in a monarchy.”95 
These illustrative quotations from both primary and secondary sources barely 
skim the surface, but they are sufficient to demonstrate that the Founders were as 
worried about government agents who obeyed their principals’ instructions as 
they were about those who might not.96 Lawson’s and Seidman’s characterization 
88. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 404 (1969). 
89. FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 291 (1985). 
90.
91. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 299 (Robert A. Rutland and Charles F. Hobson eds. 1977). 
92. Cecilia Kenyon, Men of Little Faith, 12 WM & M. Q. 3, 42–43 (1955). 
93. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 74, at 39 (May 31). 
94. Essays by a Farmer No. I, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 15 (Herbert J. Storing 
ed. 1981) (hereinafter STORING, COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST). 
95. Letter from Agrippa to the Massachusetts Convention (Feb. 5, 1788), in 4 STORING, COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 94, at 111. 
96. Daryl Levinson makes a similar point: The Founders, in his words, were concerned about agency 
problems but also “worried that the principal-agent relationship between constituents and their 
representative would be all to tight, allowing . . . the oppression of minorities.” Levinson, Parchment 
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of the Constitution as a power of attorney focuses solely on the latter problem, 
thus missing half the historical debate. 
Ironically, illuminating the Founding generation’s fear of majority tyranny 
might bolster the authors’ conservative political agenda, insofar as the broad fed-
eral legislation they decry is the product of popular majorities. But, of course, not 
all popularly enacted legislation is tyrannical, and separating valid from invalid 
legislation thus requires a political theory about the nature of rights.97 Eschewing 
such a theory, Lawson and Seidman instead rely on an argument that limits the 
powers of government—but in the process, they distort history. 
Even aside from the Founders’ views, recognizing the potential for a tyranny 
of the majority reveals a final problem with characterizing the Constitution as a 
power of attorney. The next Part addresses that problem. 
IV. CONFLICTING PRINCIPALS 
The recognition that some factions of “We the People” might oppress others 
(in other words, the possibility of tyranny of the majority) creates a further com-
plication. It is a recognition that there are conflicts of interest among the princi-
pals who are, according to Lawson and Seidman, delegating a power of attorney 
to the government. If we include “our posterity” as other beneficiaries of the 
power of attorney—as Lawson and Seidman do98—the conflicts multiply even 
more. 
And, in fact, it is resolving these conflicts of interest among the citizenry (and 
future citizens) that is the primary activity of government today, and the driving 
force behind most of the legislation Lawson and Seidman criticize. What costs 
may be imposed on the many in order to safeguard healthcare for the few who 
cannot afford it? When does intrastate commerce have a sufficient relationship to 
interstate commerce so that the former must be regulated in order to protect the 
latter? How do we balance the rights of property owners and corporations today 
against the harms of climate change in the future? How do we allocate rights 
between private citizens who want to discriminate and the victims of that discrim-
ination? These are the sorts of questions that underlie government decisions to 
and Politics, supra note 46, at 666. Michael Klarman takes a somewhat different approach, suggesting 
that only the elite Federalists favored the “undemocratic” provisions of the Constitution; “most 
Americans would have expected or wanted” a “vastly different Constitution.” KLARMAN, supra note 64, 
at 540. The Federalists nevertheless managed to secure ratification through “built-in advantages and 
miscalculations by their opponents” as well as by “ma[king] some of their own luck” and by “presenting 
the country with a stark choice between the admittedly flawed Articles . . . and the vastly different 
Constitution,” disallowing any intermediate options. Id. at 610–11. If Klarman is right, it weakens 
Lawson’s and Seidman’s argument still further by undermining the legitimacy of relying on the original 
meaning of a Constitution that essentially put one over on the American people. We should neither 
venerate nor slavishly adhere to a document that was the result of a coup—which, of course, is part of 
Klarman’s point. 
97. For a preliminary sketch of just such a theory against the conservative, deregulatory agenda, see 
Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism: Defending Carolene Products, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
559 (2016). 
98. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 50. 
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enact many of the laws that Lawson and Seidman seek to invalidate as an uncon-
stitutional exercise of power beyond that granted by the power of attorney. 
Viewing government’s role as adjusting relationships among We the People 
rather than as solely the people’s agent is not a recent invention. Madison himself 
wrote that “the regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the prin-
cipal task of modern legislation.”99 As Gordon Wood notes, by the 1790s most 
Americans recognized that “[p]olitics . . . could no longer be described as a con-
test between rulers and people” because the “political struggles would in fact be 
among the people themselves.”100 
What does this recognition of competing interests among the principals mean 
for the thesis that the Constitution is—or should be interpreted as if it were—a 
power of attorney? It makes a hash of it, because fiduciary law prohibits agents 
from representing multiple parties whose interests conflict. As the Restatement of 
the Law of Agency (Third) puts it: “[A]n agent who acts on behalf of more than 
one principal in a transaction between or among the principals has breached the 
agent’s duty of loyalty to each principal through undertaking service to multiple 
principals that divides the agent’s loyalty.”101 In particular, an agent with multiple 
principals may not act as an agent for more than one of them with regard to any 
particular matter or transaction,102 unless there is no substantial conflict among 
them.103 The Supreme Court has held that “[a] fiduciary cannot contend ‘that, 
although he had conflicting interests, he served his masters equally well or that 
his primary loyalty was not weakened by the pull of his secondary one.’”104 
Thus, it is contrary to the law of agency—that is, the law governing fiduciary 
relationships—to allow the government to represent, through a power of attorney, 
the conflicting interests of all the principals who make up We the People. 
Lawson and Seidman might respond that in ratifying the Constitution, We the 
People have consented to allow the branches of government to represent us all. 
This argument is insufficient. First, it seems inconsistent with the underlying pur-
pose of a power of attorney for multiple principals to authorize an agent (or sev-
eral agents) to represent all of them in their dealings with one another. The 
purpose of a power of attorney is to allow an agent to act in lieu of the principal 
99. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 80, at 79. 
100. WOOD, supra note 69, at 80. 
101. 2 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 3D § 8.03 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006); see also 
DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS 120 (2d ed. 2002) (“The mere existence 
of dual agency violates the duty of undivided loyalty.”). 
102. 1 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 3D § 3.14; see also [2005] UKHL 8, 1 W.L.R. 567, 
567 (Eng.) (noting that a lawyer’s duty of loyalty “very frequently makes it professionally improper and 
a breach of his duty to act for two clients with conflicting interests in the transaction at hand”); cf. UNIF. 
TRUSTS ACT § 6 (1937) (forbidding the trustee of one trust from selling property to itself as the trustee of 
another trust). 
103. 1 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 3D § 3.16. 
104. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 330 (1981) (quoting Woods v. City National Bank & 
Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 269 (1941)). 
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to accomplish the principal’s wishes; where the wishes of multiple principals 
conflict, the agent cannot fulfill his duties. 
Further, if an agent (after appropriate disclosures) obtains multiple principals’ 
consent to represent them all, the agent “owes duties of good faith, disclosure, 
and fair dealing to all of the principals.”105 But good faith and fair dealing are a 
far cry from—and might well be inconsistent with—the strict limitations on dele-
gated power that Lawson and Seidman advocate. Indeed, the representation of 
multiple principals in the same transaction, to the extent that it is permitted at all, 
seems much closer to what Lawson and Seidman describe as the business judg-
ment rule, which contains “a presumption that in making a business decision the 
directors of a corporation acted . . . in good faith.”106 As they note, this is a 
“highly deferential” standard.107 
Finally, even if representation of multiple principals is permitted and subjects 
the agent to the standard fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, those duties are 
owed to each of the principals. And that brings us right back to the problem that 
most modern governmental decisions pose the dilemma of how to adjust the 
rights, duties, and relationships among different citizens. Acting as an appropriate 
fiduciary for one set of principals will often entail violating fiduciary duties to 
another set.108 
This last point yields an observation about the appropriate characterization of 
the Constitution. Adjusting the rights, duties, and relationships among different 
segments of the public—which is a large part of what government does—makes 
the government more of an arbitrator than a fiduciary. Fiduciaries represent the 
interests of their principals; arbitrators decide disputes among principals. Perhaps 
in ratifying the Constitution, We the People consented to having government enti-
ties arbitrate our differences. Characterizing the Constitution as making the fed-
eral government a species of arbitrator is much more consistent with both the 
general views of the Founding generation and the role of government in modern 
America than is characterizing the Constitution as a power of attorney. But doing 
so does not lead where Lawson and Seidman want to go: toward deregulation and 
small government. So we are back to my original point: “A Great Power of 
Attorney” is not so much a historical work as a political one. 
105. 2 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 3D § 8.06. Lawson and Seidman don’t talk about the 
duty of fair dealing, but they do talk about the duty of impartiality, which seems similar. See LAWSON & 
SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 151. 
106. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 137. The rule also presumes that the directors acted “on 
an informed basis” and “in the honest belief” that they were acting in the best interests of the 
corporation. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. One scholar suggests that conflicting duties to multiple principals may be resolved by 
privileging the duty of loyalty over the duty of care. Arthur R. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in 
Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 75 (2004). That does not help in this context, because the 
options that the government chooses among do not neatly divide into violations of the duty of care and 
violations of the duty of loyalty. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Founders could not imagine that they were creating a Constitution that would 
last for more than two centuries. The pessimists among them thought it might not 
last a generation.109 
See, e.g., Herbert Mitgang, New Light on 1787 and Washington’s Doubts, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 
1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/04/arts/new-light-on-1787-and-washington-s-doubts.html [https:// 
perma.cc/G8GW-WPW8].  
The reason they were wrong is that the Constitution grew and 
changed—with and without formal amendments—as the country did. Lawson and 
Seidman wish to undo much of that historical development. In support of their pro-
ject, they purport to describe our fiduciary Constitution. Ultimately, however, they 
are merely describing an imaginary Constitution of their own creation.  
109.
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